

- 7A -

MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT: An examination of present production policy in ORE, recommendations for correcting present errors, and suggestions as to future plans and policies.

The problems posed in this paper must be considered with the whole ORE production program if a creative solution is to be reached. It is proposed, therefore, that the overall problem be broken down and discussed under the following headings:

What are the uses of the various types of CIG intelligence?

How do these uses effect the formats of these types of intelligence?

What can be done by means of better editorial direction, to expedite ORE production?

What are the uses of the various types of ORE intelligence?

This question quite properly leads us to approach the intelligence producing program of ORE, not from the viewpoint of writers and editors; but from the view-

SECRET

point of the men who will use ORE's output in the interests of the national security. These men, unlike most editors and writers, are executives, they operate the nation; they are therefore men who must act, sometimes swiftly and incisively. It may fairly be assumed that they will not handle ORE material themselves but will require members of their staffs to assemble quickly material on matters in which they are at that moment vitally concerned.

We are on safe ground, then, if we recognize that the availability of individual details is a first requirement of the overall use-picture. This requires, in its turn, not only a fully developed filing system but that the producing staff be accustomed to a special type of writing.


In a certain sense, one of the main differences between the various types of intelligence proposed in Enclosure (A), Item 3 is the time element. An item may be of greatest interest at 10 AM today and be of no further interest in the intelligence picture by mid-afternoon. Such items require fastest processing and dissemination. Then too, there is permanent intelligence such as topographic features; many of these are timeless. Material having a durable value is called Basic Intelligence while that in which the time element is most important is Flash Intelligence. About midway between these two, we have Staff Intelligence which, aside from special studies, is represented by Situation Reports.

With those general statements in mind, it is

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SECRET

possible to review the intelligence production system.
The following diagram indicates the place held in the plan laid down in Enclosure A, 3 by the various types of ORE intelligence:



It is recognized that ORE production cannot be considered wholly from the viewpoint of CIG readers. For example, there is in the policy to publish a Daily and a Weekly a large admixture of publicity for CIG; it being hoped that these periodicals would indicate to the President and others that CIG is "in being" although yet unable to produce intelligence on a "national policy" level. This circumstance lends an atmosphere of unreality to the publishing effort, and while there can be no doubt in the realm of real politik that CIG should attempt to cover its weaknesses from official gaze, it is perhaps desirable to try to estimate whether new and more effective publicity means might not be discovered which would be less dangerous to CIG's reputation than the media now employed.

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DAILY AND WEEKLY SUMMARIES AND BULLETINS.

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The overt reason for publishing a Daily and Weekly Summary is to provide the President with current intelligence trends. A Daily item* presents, so to speak, a single, clear pattern; a Weekly item shows the larger and more complex pattern which comes of grouping a series of related Daily items and adding to them a certain amount of evaluation and background material.

Both these periodicals are assumed to have a general intelligence-news value for their readers. Because almost none of their contents is of greatest importance and because almost none of it requires executive action, these publications should be in general regarded as providing background material.

In addition to the Daily and Weekly, the ORE has at its disposal a means of communicating the most important current intelligence items, which require high level attention. This means is listed in Enclosure (A), item 3, 2, a, as "Bulletins". These are to contain "matters of urgency" and shall include "evaluation and interpretation". They, insofar as current intelligence is concerned, are the most important and, potentially, the most useful means of CIG publicity. They will be considered in greater detail later.

* Daily items are mere paraphrases of cables to which a "Comment" is occasionally added. Thus they represent the simplest sort of intelligence reporting.

SECRET

Experience indicates that the conditions under which intelligence dailies are produced not only limit their intelligence value, but make them singularly liable to error. The records show that a daily existed in ONI during the first part of the last war but was given up after a few months; the JIC had one which lasted somewhat longer but which was suspended because of erroneous estimates... no allowance being made for a reasonable margin of error. Judging by the number of articles marked by Admiral Leahy for the President's attention in the Daily (CIG) it would appear that the effort is largely wasted from the Presidential viewpoint.

As stated above, the Weekly is merely a somewhat more rounded treatment of current intelligence. That is to say, the individual items are more fully developed; where possible, the relationships of events are indicated and the progress of trends is noted. Almost none of these items contain definite forecasts, they are like the progress photographs made during the construction of a large building; interesting in themselves but giving little idea of what the finished structure will be like.

It is difficult to believe that the President has the time to concern himself with these ad interim situations, nor is there much indication that Admiral Leahy shows many of these items to him. Obviously, CIG was established to operate on a much higher intelligence level than is envisioned for the Weekly and it is extremely doubtful that it is in the best interests of CIG to issue a publication that is not representative of its best. Anyone who has had experience in public relations for large industrial

SECRET

and financial institutions knows that it is axiomatic that silence is preferable to false or non-representative statements or publications. The good will of great companies has been destroyed or severely damaged for long periods of time because this maxim was disregarded.

An estimate of the value of the Daily and Weekly Summaries would be incomplete which did not give consideration to their competitors. The State Department was first in the field with weekly and daily publications, and the War Department issues a weekly Intelligence Review which parallels much of the State Department and CIG Weeklies... These departmental publications have a publishing advantage which CIG lacks; namely, each in its own field has earlier access to incoming intelligence information used by CIG and in addition receives other material that never reaches CIG. To overcome these disadvantages, CIG tries desperately to improve on the literary and intellectual content of its publications; but the fact that the CIG editorial staff is green, that it contains few professional editors or writers, and that its relations with the geographic desks are strained tends largely to nullify this admirable effort, which fails more often than it succeeds.

While the foregoing negative factors in the daily and weekly picture may not at once balance out the affirmative publicity factor served by these publications, it is nevertheless possible

SECRET

that objective review would indicate other solutions to the CIG problem. Consideration might be given, for example to the weekly "dry runs" which have been prepared over a period of months in the Eastern and Western European Branches. These "typewritten publications" differ from the official Weekly Summary in that they report on the overall intelligence developments in each nation. Thus, they provide a continuous record of each nation and at the same time indicate the significant trends as they appear. These "dry runs", having continuity, could be indexed and made the basis for an intelligence chronology of the world.

These unofficial publications, which are circulated only in ORE, have an interesting potential. Remembering that CIG has a reciprocal duty to its supporting agencies, it is quite possible that the dry run idea should be developed into a CIG Weekly that could be distributed to MIS, ONI, A-2 and the State Department for the use not only of top level personnel but also for use in the various geographic intelligence desks. One of the values of such a publication can be illustrated by the fact that as the Navy will have fewer officers available for intelligence work in peace time than in war, and as a result there will be a greater need for these officers to concentrate on Naval matters; it will become increasingly valuable to them and their Director to have a weekly publication such as these dry runs which takes care of all the non-naval intelligence matters. Moreover, it can fairly be assumed that

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ORE personnel should, over the long haul, a greater competence and have better backgrounds for the production of such intelligence than the typical military or naval desk. It is quite possible also, that such a weekly would improve the liaison between CIG and the recipients.

Inasmuch as a NIA directive exists which indicates that CIG is to relieve the Departments of certain of their duplicative functions, it would appear that the weekly situation offers a very sound point of departure for initiating this policy. It is proposed therefore that CIG take the initiative in calling together a meeting of those responsible for all the intelligence weekly summaries published in Washington, that the meeting be directed to work out plans for a joint or unified weekly, that this weekly be published by CIG with the active support of the departments (suitable credit being given to them, lest they loose too much publicity value), and that the first issue shall appear not later than 1 October 1947.

Such a publication would not only provide CIG with sufficient and appropriate publicity but, by taking the initiative in such a consolidation, CIG would be able to save the Government a considerable amount of money. Moreover, it would be a clear demonstration of the fact that CIG has begun to perform one of its essential functions; namely, that it is in fact acting openly as an intelligence

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coordinating agency. It could also be pointed out to the top echelon readers that the joint weekly would relieve War and Navy of handling political, economic, technical and other types of intelligence and enable them, with their diminishing staffs to put their full efforts into their own special types of intelligence work. Significant too is the fact that a Secret Weekly of the type recommended would carry almost all the background current intelligence that should be forwarded to top echelon CIG readers. The probable format and contents of such a weekly are suggested in the section of this paper dealing with such matters.

While there can be little doubt in view of all the circumstances that the CIG should make this effort to publish a unified weekly, continuation of the daily, in view of all the circumstances narrated, appears very open to question. The realistic approach to this question from a publicity as well as an intelligence viewpoint, suggests that the daily in its present form is more an adjunct of the State Department than of CIG. This statement is based on the fact that the State Department is, by its basic mission, required to be cognizant of political developments from hour to hour throughout the world, whereas CIG is properly concerned only with those developments which have a direct bearing on US security. This is a serious and noteworthy distinction and if it is not observed the State Department may well come to feel that CIG, for mere publicity purposes, is trying to encroach on its

SECRET

traditional field. Moreover, since the CIG is in an unfavorable competitive position in this matter, as already noted, and is for other reasons liable to error*; it might be in the best interests of CIG's reputation to give up its daily effort in favor of the State Department and develop, not only as a means of publicity but as a medium of valid, high level intelligence, the idea of the Bulletin as stated in Enclosure A 3.

To date, Bulletins have been put out as "Special Evaluations". Moreover, the standards set by IS have been so stringent that evaluations prepared by WE have been pocketed, in effect, by IS or have been rewritten so many times that they have lost their value because they became out of date.

In order to realize the Enclosure's purpose in making Bulletins part of CIG current intelligence, it is necessary to widen the IS definition of "Bulletins" and to recognize that provision must be made in their appearance and title to indicate that they are of varying degrees of urgency. Obviously, if we think of Bulletins as being only "Flash" intelligence, we will be led into error. Suppose, for example, that Premier Stalin were assassinated. While there can be no doubt that this event would constitute "Flash" intelligence

* Enclosure (G) is of interest in this connection for it is obvious that the strain under which the IS is described as working increases the probability of error in the Daily and presents a fertile avenue whereby CIG might become discredited.

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of the purest variety, there is little likelihood that CIG's account of this "item" would be the first to reach the President's desk. ~~It is equally obvious that an evaluation of such an event, prepared with the speed that the event would require, would be fatuous.~~

This observation is made in order to indicate that Bulletins, while including such matters as Mr. Stalin's demise, must not be conceived of nor edited primarily as dealing with climactic or catastrophic events. Attention must, rather, be strongly centered on the fact that intelligence is above all things a PREVENTIVE. Only by the perspicacity of its evaluations and estimates, only by the accuracy of its forecasts can an intelligence organization endure. Now, since a daily intelligence publication cannot by reason of the time element carry sensible evaluations or estimates, as a general thing, it is obvious that the Bulletin is the only type of current intelligence publication that can exhibit these essential intelligence characteristics. It follows from this that CIG should make every effort to produce more and better Bulletins.

It is possible that it might be argued that CIG lacks sufficient personnel for this purpose but this argument is groundless since the time consumed in the production of items for the Daily would be productive of very good results if it were devoted to the preparation of Bulletins. To support this statement it is necessary to note that, for example, during the week of 19-24 May the CIG Daily Summary

SECRET

carried 48 items and that half of each day was given by one analyst in WE to the preparation of the contributions of this branch. Perhaps an hour a day was devoted by the Chief of the Branch to criticizing these items. In addition, conferences were held on each item with the desks responsible for the ~~items~~ ^{work}. To say then that a half day of one man is required by the Daily of WE each day in the week is conservative.

There are moreover four other geographic branches in ORE which more or less duplicate this effort. In addition the Chief of Current Intelligence who edits the Daily spends at least half of his time on this publication and frequently calls in for consultation other members of IS.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Daily consumes at least three full man days a week of analyst's effort or enough time for the production of at least two Bulletins. Obviously from a publicity as well as from an intelligence viewpoint, two well reasoned, finely evaluated, meaningful Bulletins a week that would show the President the reasons for constructive action in respect to US national security, are greatly to be preferred to 48 daily items which are unevaluated, which are for the most part contained in the State Department Daily, and which, judging by Admiral Leahy's pencil marks on returned copies, are rarely of the slightest interest to top echelon personnel... in other words, to the men who CIG seeks most eagerly to impress.

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Since then there is undoubtedly personnel available in ORE for the production of good Bulletins, it remains to set the editorial or intelligence target for them. This is best done by suggesting the median line, in an intelligence sense, for the sensible policy for this type of intelligence. An example of material acceptable for a Bulletin will suffice.

Some weeks ago, the United Nations desk was able to pass through the IS a Special Evaluation which pointed out that UNESCO was in danger of being packed by non-Soviet Communist scientists. The evaluation pointed out that through them, the USSR, which had refused to participate in UNESCO, might have access to atomic research information. There is reason to believe that the President acted preventively on this ORE document.

The foregoing item is regarded as "median" because it obviously is not the most pressing type of intelligence nor does it contain intelligence which, while of substantial importance in a foreign nation or international situation, does not be itself have a present influence on US security. An illustration of the latter type of material is the manoeuvring which Franco is now conducting in Spain to purge the outer layers of his regime of persons who, having been Falangists, were a focus of attack when the UN anti-Franco resolution was passed. He has now almost completed a shifting of personnel so that the unwary might

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believe, next time the issue is raised, that he has in fact purged his Government of notorious totalitarians. Actually of course, he has retained in less public positions the Falangists on whom he has always relied, as well as the integrity of the organization. This is a situation that does not now need to be called to the President's attention but it should be contained in a "Ready" file of intelligence in his office.

Thus it is possible to recommend that there should be three classes of Bulletins: 1. Flash, 2. Executive, 3. Information. By means of such a Bulletin, CIG would be able to give proper evaluation not only to material that should now be going out as "Special Evaluations" but it could also handle and supply interpretations to the kind of material that Admiral Leahy occasionally checks in the Daily and Weekly Summaries for the President's attention. Should the joint secret weekly proposed above be initiated, the Bulletins could also be used to disseminate top secret material which could not be carried in a secret periodical. Such a treatment would be more impressive to recipients than if these items were buried in a typewritten or printed weekly summary.

In conclusion, it seems likely that persons in high places will not forever fail to recognize that the State Department Daily is at least as mature a summary as the CIG Daily, that almost all of the items dealt with in the CIG Daily fall outside the realm of CIG primary cognizance, i.e.

SECRET

they do not have direct, meaningful application to, but rather a piecemeal affect on our national policy. It is also believed that in publishing a Daily, CIG exposes itself to the danger and fact of error because of the greater pressure under such intelligence Dailies are always produced, that because CIG receives its dispatches from the contributing agencies, its Daily will always be later in reaching its readers than a Daily put out by a contributing agency and will therefore always lack "news value".

It is believed that if CIG gives up its Daily and concentrates on Bulletins, it will be able to develop a reputation for fine and thoughtful evaluations of current intelligence, so that in the end, although the CIG's existence will be less frequently brought to the attention of high echelon officials, the work of this agency will attain a standing and stature of great importance.

It is also believed that the Weekly Summary should become a joint publication under CIG editorial direction and that the three classes of Bulletins be published under the editorial policy outlined above.

Looking at these conclusions from the viewpoint of CIG readers, it is obvious that much of their reading time will be served, that they will realize that CIG is an agency with a unique and

SECRET

- 22 -

useful mission that is being realized along sound lines.

SECRETSITUATION REPORTS

Sensible planning of Situation Reports* must be predicated on their position in the overall CIG production program as well as the uses to which they may be put by high echelon readers.

If it be assumed that the Bulletins will take care of important current intelligence, that a Weekly can be established to disseminate necessary "background" intelligence, and if, further, we assume that under basic intelligence there will be deposited all the "live" rather than merely academic, classified intelligence material required for the security of the US, then it is apparent that Situation Reports fall, generally speaking, into the category of "briefings".

They must be, therefore, well written studies, prepared on the assumption that they will be read from beginning to end by high echelon personnel in search of a general picture of a foreign nation's potential threat to US security or its ability and willingness to be of assistance. The length of these Reports should be determined not by the amount of material available

* No opportunity has been given for examination of similar State Department Reports. They are said to be purely political, but some of them are reported as excellent.

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but by the amount of time the President might devote to a given country. This is, of course, a matter of conjecture, but it is not unreasonable to assume that he would not devote more than one hour, perhaps in the evening, to a study of the general picture of a great nation. This would suggest that 50 pages of typescript, double-spaced, would be the maximum length of a Report on either the USSR [] If this be accepted temporarily, it would appear that a country like [] which has only the slightest possible affect on US security should be covered in not more than five pages.

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Very serious thought should be given to the appearance of these Reports and to the possibilities of employing graphic presentations in them. (This will be discussed under a later heading). At any rate, it must be borne in mind that a Situation Report is a document presenting, in highly readable form, the very broadest and most salient facts about the dynamics of a given nation. It follows from this that descriptions of topography can best be left to a convenient Atlas and long range historic background to the volumes of lay historians.

Basic Intelligence

Basic Intelligence is the backbone, the fundamental library, of ORE. It is the base of the triangle on the preceding page. Theoretically, it should contain all the classified intelligence required by "those who need to know". It must be constantly scrutinized by competent personnel to insure that it contains all the items that are relevant to our national security, that

SECRET

these items be of executive rather than academic quality, and that they be restricted in general to material that is not available in popular or unrestricted publications. Items of the last variety can be obtained through the Times Index and through similar reference works* that deal with current periodicals. The Library of Congress can be relied upon to keep CIG informed of useful books.

The form which items of basic intelligence might take will be considered later. It is sufficient to again stress here that availability of material and precise editing are two "musts", from the reader's viewpoint.

HOW DO THE USES OF CIG INTELLIGENCE EFFECT THE FORMAT OF THE VARIOUS TYPES?

If the Daily is to be continued, largely for the purposes of CIG publicity, it would be well to consult the chief topographer of the Government Printing Office in order that it may be as pleasing in appearance as the State Department Daily. On the whole, it may be thought undignified to employ the arts of the layout man in connection with intelligence documents; nevertheless, it was found during the war that a handsome type page was more easily read than a mere piece of typescript, and that it tended to suggest to its readers that the producing organization took a certain pride in its work. (This statement applies to all ORE production). It is also likely that the CIG Daily might be put on different paper, cut to new dimensions so that it would stand out from

* Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, International Index of Periodicals

SECRET

the work of other agencies. The task of determining these matters must be assigned to special personnel. It is likely that the Daily should not be allowed to become any longer than it is at present.

The Weekly should also receive this treatment. From the reader's viewpoint, there are no special requirements as to format save that this publication be agreeable in appearance and easy to handle.

Such a weekly

should probably begin with not more than 10 pages of evaluated intelligence summary and be followed with a series of "departments". These would include: International Relations, Domestic Conditions in Foreign Countries, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs and Air Affairs. Each "department" of the Weekly would consist of individual articles written wholly from the viewpoint of US security.

The Situation Reports should be put into light, looseleaf binders. They should be typewritten in large type on standard paper. It is considered possible that the cover sheet should carry a graphic presentation of the potentials of each country. Perhaps these graphs should assume the form of a series of dials broken down into 200 segments. Thus, if we use the composite industrial potential of the US on a given day as equalling 100, the industrial potential would probably appear to be less than 1 per

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cent. This would give, at a glance, the relative industrial positions of the two nations. Similar dials could be worked out for national wealth, manpower, raw materials, popularity of present government, military, naval and air potentials, etc. The center of the sheet should be occupied by a large dial on the same basic scale (whatever one is adopted) that would combine the other dials to show what the potential of the nation under consideration is in respect to US security. That dial gives the big news at a glance. Also, it is probable that these documents should contain short bibliographies indexed by subjects so that the President will know where to look for texts, outside the Basic files, that might be of interest to him.

Basic Intelligence: If Basic Intelligence is conceived as containing all the classified intelligence data required by those who "need to know" it must assume the form of cards (or sheets of heavy bond paper) in a file cabinet rather than being placed in a series of large loose leaf binders. This statement is made on the following assumptions: 1. The amount of material will become enormous; 2. It will be constantly growing so that new material must be added every day to the main body of data; deletions will also be necessary; 3. The material must be readily available in detail. This means that it is better to have the card on, say, the machine guns in use by the than to have to copy this material out of a loose leaf binder. Such cards might be placed instantly before the President, in certain instances; a procedure far more effective than carrying

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a cumbersome volume into his desk or taking time to have an item copied by a stenographer. These files should probably employ the intelligence indexing system used in MIS.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO EXPEDITE THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH INTELLIGENCE BY MEANS OF BETTER EDITORIAL DIRECTION?

A previous memorandum made recommendations for the redistribution of the Intelligence Staff as a means of expediting ORE production. These recommendations were designed primarily to cut down the amount of friction that is inevitable if intelligence is not produced in almost finished form by the geographic branches of an intelligence service. The present memorandum draws attention to the necessity for clearer editorial direction in ORE. This requires the exercise of professional executive editorial thinking in order that 1. ORE publications can be clearly planned from the viewpoint of those who use them. 2. Specific, clearly written directives be worked out for each type of intelligence produced and that these directives be disseminated to all the producing desks in ORE. 3. That a "style book" be prepared, comparable to those used by various newspapers for the general guidance of writers in matters of preferred verbal usage. 4. Suitable and attractive formats be created for ORE documents. 5. The possibilities of graphic presentation of intelligence data be fully explored and applied. 6. The filing of basic intelligence data be studied in order that the preparation of material for inclusion in Basic

SECRET

Intelligence shall be suitable in form and style.

CONCLUSION:

The foregoing suggestions are offered not as being in any sense definitive but rather to make it clear that a conscious effort toward proper editorial planning, rather than the present inept way of "working things out as we go along", is essential if even a modest degree of efficiency is to prevail in ORE intelligence production. This apparent inefficiency in which several dozen able men are involved comes about because there is no clear editorial direction at the present time, and hence no valid target at which the efforts of the producing sections can direct their energies. This situation hampers and confuses men who are earnestly trying to produce intelligence that will be of value to the nation. It is very apparent that their efforts cannot avail so long as their writing is screened by men who have not yet been able or willing to express their standards and requirements in writing, and whose powers in matters of substantive as well as editorial changes, are still undefined. This failure on the part of IS as a whole does not suggest lack of sincere effort on the part of its members but rather an apparent total lack of executive editorial experience.

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